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BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS, LLC v. FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION: USING THE CHANGED
CIRCUMSTANCES THRESHOLD FOR OIL PIPELINE
RATES TO RE-ENFORCE THE TERMS OF EPAct
AND TO FURTHER ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) was enforced to limit
challenges to effective pipeline rates which shippers must pay an oil
pipeline for its transportation services.1 A rate that meets EPAct's
requirements is "deemed just and reasonable" and therefore, sub-
ject to grandfathering. 2 Unless a shipper is able to meet one of the
stringent substantial change exceptions delineated in EPAct,
grandfathered rates may not be subject to challenge by shippers or
revised by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). 3
Grandfathering therefore precludes shippers from receiving the
benefits of either a reduction in tariff rates or a refund from an
unreasonable rate pursuant to a successful challenge to an expen-
sive pipeline tariff.4 In effect, EPAct operates to reduce litigation
concerning pipeline rates.5
In BP West Coast Products, LLC v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission,6 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit considered four principle issues: (1) whether
adding a new origination point to an already existing pipeline con-
1. SeeBP West Coast Prods., LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 374 F.3d
1263, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (describing that rates that qualify for grandfathering
are immune from challenge with some limited exceptions). A rate is a charge
shippers are obligated to pay an oil pipeline for its transportation services. Energy
Policy Act of 1992 § 1804(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (2000).
2. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (2000) (defining
requirements for rates to be subject to grandfathering). To qualify for
grandfathering, a rate must meet two requirements: (1) the rate must have been
effective for one year prior to EPAct's enactment, on October 24, 1992; and (2)
the rate must not have been subject to "protest, investigation, or complaint" dur-
ing that one year period. Id.
3. See id. (discussing that shippers may challenge grandfathered rates by pre-
senting evidence of substantial change to FERC). Evidence of a substantial change
is limited to: (1) the oil pipeline's economic circumstances which were a basis for
the rate; or (2) the nature of the services which served as the basis of the rate. Id.
4. See id. (noting that where FERC concludes rate is unreasonable, challenger
may be entitled to refund or reduction from date complaint was filed).
5. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (discussing Congress' rationale
behind EPAct).
6. 374 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
(237)
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stituted a substantial change; (2) whether the grandfathering provi-
sions applied to rates not filed with FERC; (3) whether transporting
a new type of fuel constituted a substantial change; and (4) what
acts constituted a "protest, investigation, or complaint."7 This case
is significant because the court examined EPAct's threshold inquiry
of changed circumstances.8
In BP West Coast Products, the D.C. Circuit held that adding a
new origination point to an already existing pipeline does not alter
existing shipping rates or constitute a new tariff, making it there-
fore eligible for grandfathering. 9 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit held
that unfiled rates and rates for transporting a new fuel type were
not eligible for grandfathering. 10 Finally, the D.C. Circuit held that
a rate was subject to protest, investigation or complaint, when the
challenge specifically addressed the rate's reasonableness. 1"
This Note analyzes the D.C. Circuit's holding in BP West Coast
Products.12 Part II discusses the relevant facts in BP West Coast Prod-
ucts.13 Part III discusses the precedent and statutes relevant to the
D.C. Circuit's analysis.' 4 Part IV describes the D.C. Circuit's analysis
and holding. 15 Part V critically analyzes the D.C. Circuit's hold-
ing.' 6 Lastly, Part VI discusses the impact of the D.C. Circuit's
holding.' 7
7. See id. at 1272-78 (analyzing issues court reviewed).
8. See Oil Pipeline Regulation Committee, Report of the Oil Pipeline Regulation
Comm., 24 ENERGY L.J. 261, 261 (2003) (noting that this case represented first time
changed circumstances standard was litigated before FERC); see also BP West Coast
Prods., 374 F.3d at 1271 (noting same for reason that issues presented were com-
plicated).
9. See 374 F.3d at 1273 (comparing addition of new origination point to addi-
tion of on-ramp to highway).
10. See id. at 1273-75 (discussing how unfiled rates could not satisfy EPAct
requirements and noting that transportation of turbine fuel was new and therefore
precluded from grandfathering).
11. See id. at 1275-76 (distinguishing general protest, investigation or com-
plaint from specific ones).
12. See id. at 1272-81 (discussing holdings for issues presented to court).
13. For a discussion of facts in BP West Coast Products, see infra notes 18-37 and
accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of relevant precedent and statutes, see infra notes 38-64
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of court's analysis and holding, see infra notes 65-111 and
accompanying text.
16. For a critical analysis of the holding, see infra notes 1 2-74 and accompa-
nying text.
17. For a discussion of the impact of the holding, see infra notes 175-86 and
accompanying text.
2




Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline, L.P. (SFPP) operates pipelines which
transport petroleum products throughout the country.18 SFPP's
operation includes an East Line and a West Line. 19 The West Line
consists of pipelines extending from Watson Station in Los Angeles,
California to various western states.20 In 1989, SFPP decided to in-
crease the minimum pumping rate and pressure from Watson Sta-
tion.21 SFPP customers agreed to use its facilities at an additional
cost.22 SFPP, however, never filed these new contracts with FERC.2 3
In July 1992, SFPP revised Tariff Nos. 15, 16 and 17 to add a
new origination point to its West Line, and a rate for shipping ser-
vices from that origination point to Arizona. 24 The added rate,
however, was not new.25 In December 1992, SFPP filed Tariff No.
18, proposing to transport turbine fuel, a new type of fuel, on its
West Line. 26 Tariff No. 18's rate for turbine fuel was equal to other
grandfathered rates which had been effective since 1989.27
FERC reached four distinct conclusions regarding each one of
SFPP's changes.28 First, FERC determined that Tariff Nos. 15, 16
and 17 qualified for grandfathering. 29 Second, FERC concluded
18. See BP West Coast Prods., LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 374 F.3d
1263, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing transportation of oil on SFPP's pipelines);
see also ConocoPhillips Wins Landmark Decision on Grandfathered Rates, http:www.dor-
sey.com/services/success -detail.aspx?success-id=103339903&FlashNavID=services
_success (Mar. 21, 2005) (stating that SFPP is subsidiary of Kinder Morgan Energy
Partners).
19. SeeBP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1270 (describing SFPP's East Line and
West Line).
20. See id. at 1273 (noting that origination point on West Line for shipments
to Phoenix and Tucson is Watson).
21. See id. (explaining that SFPP gave its shippers choice of either providing
their own pressurization facilities or using SFPP built facility for surcharge).
22. See id. (discussing transportation charges for SFPP's new enhancement
services).
23. See id. (noting that SFPP failed to file enhancement contracts because it
believed these contracts were beyond FERC's jurisdiction).
24. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272 (discussing SFPP's revisions to its
West Line pipeline rates that went into effect in October of 1992 after grandfather-
ing window had closed).
25. See id. (noting rate for new origination point was similar to SFPP's rates
for two other source points in Los Angeles area).
26. See id. at 1274 (explaining that turbine fuel is more commonly known as
jet fuel).
27. See id. (noting rates that existed since 1989 were eligible for grandfather-
ing).
28. See id. at 1272-81 (discussing FERC's adjudications).
29. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272 (discussing FERC's conclusion
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that SFPP was required to file the contracts for its improved ser-
vices.30 Third, FERC found that although Tariff No. 18 did not
qualify for grandfathering, Tariff No. 18 was not subject to chal-
lenge because it was equal to other rates that were just and reasona-
ble. 3 1 Fourth, FERC concluded that EPAct section 1803 required
that the protest, investigation or complaint should specifically chal-
lenge a rate's reasonableness. 32
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that SFPP's rates from its new
origination point did not constitute a new rate.33 As a result, the
court found that the rates qualified for grandfathering. 34 The
court also held that EPAct did not apply to unfiled rates because
unfiled rates do not meet the statutory requirements. 3 5 The court
further held that FERC's decision that the turbine fuel tariff could
not be challenged was "arbitrary and capricious."3 6 Finally, the
court affirmed FERC's interpretation of the protest, investigation or
complaint provision.3 7
III. BACKGROUND
A. Energy Policy Act of 1992
EPAct precludes shippers from challenging pre-existing pipe-
line rates.38 In order to qualify for grandfathering, an oil pipeline
rate must meet two requirements: (1) the rate must have been in
effect for one full year prior to EPAct's enactment on October 24,
1992; and (2) the rate must not have been subject to "protest, inves-
tigation, or complaint" during that one year period prior to EPAct's
30. See id. at 1273 (noting that enhanced services were within FERC'sjurisdic-
tion). As a result, FERC ordered SFPP "to file a rate equal to the historic charge
in the shipper contracts." Id.
31. See id. at 1275 (noting that rate for new fuel service was equal to other
grandfathered rates that were effective since 1989).
32. See id. at 1276 (rejecting shippers' argument that general attack is suffi-
cient to challenge every aspect of tariff).
33. See id. at 1273 (discussing reasons for deferring to FERC adjudication).
34. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273 (noting that addition of new tap,
without any changes to pre-existing rates, does not constitute new rate).
35. See id. at 1274 (noting that unfiled rates failed to meet EPAct's second
requirement).
36. See id. at 1275 (noting that FERC's adjudication reached conclusion with-
out considering underlying cost of service and rate of return).
37. See id. at 1275-76 (stating successful challenge to tariff by means of protest,
investigation or complaint must allege unreasonableness of rate).
38. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (noting that failure
to meet requirements precludes rate from grandfathering protections).
4
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enactment.39 An oil pipeline rate that meets these requirements is
'just and reasonable" and therefore entitled to grandfathering.40
B. Standard of Review for Administrative Decisions
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
(Chevron) ,41 the Supreme Court established a two-part test to deter-
mine the level of judicial deference that a court should give to an
administrative agency's statutory interpretation. 42 First, a court
must determine whether Congress has expressly addressed the issue
before the court. 43 If Congress' intent is clear, then both the court
and the agency must adhere to the express intent of Congress. 44 If,
however, a court determines that Congress has not directly spoken
to the issue, then the court must invoke the second step and con-
sider whether the agency's construction of the statute is reasona-
ble. 45 The court should then give deference to an agency's
reasonable interpretation since Congress entrusts administrative
agencies with the authority to make policy decisions when a statute
is silent.46 A court may not, however, impose its own construction
of the statute. 47
In United States v. Mead Corp. (Mead),48 the Supreme Court held
that an agency's interpretation qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress has delegated to the agency the au-
thority to make rules carrying the force of law. 49 In the context of
agency adjudications, the court should defer to an agency's inter-
pretations unless the interpretation is "procedurally defective, arbi-
39. See id. (discussing grandfathering requirement).
40. See id. (noting that rate is eligible for grandfathering if it meets both
requirements).
41. See 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (discussing process for determining level
of judicial deference).
42. See id. (noting judicial deference is limited because judiciary "must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent").
43. See id. (discussing analysis used to determine proper amount of judicial
deference).
44. See id. (noting that express congressional intent prevails over judicial and
agency interpretations).
45. See id. at 843 (noting that court's inquiry is limited to whether agency's
interpretation is reasonable choice within statutory gap).
46. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (explaining that for challenge to be successful
it must state that agency's interpretation is unreasonable).
47. See id. (describing role of judiciary). The judiciary is responsible for re-
viewing agency adjudications and rejecting those that do not comply with congres-
sional intent. Id.
48. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
49. See id. at 226-27 (noting limits of Chevron deference).
2005]
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trary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."50
C. Procedure for Challenging a Pipeline Rate
FERC has the authority to establish rates and values for pipe-
lines.51 The Fifth Circuit limited the applicable challenge shippers
could bring in Mobil Alaska Pipeline Co. v. United States.52 If an indi-
vidual wants to challenge a pipeline rate that was deemed just and
reasonable, the individual must file a complaint with FERC showing
that a substantial change has occurred since EPAct's enactment. 53
If FERC determines that a rate is not just and reasonable, the rate
will not be entitled to grandfathering. 54
In BP West Coast Products, the D.C. Circuit defined the two step
process for reviewing a challenge to an oil pipeline rate. 55 First,
FERC must determine whether the rate qualifies for grandfather-
ing.56 Second, if the rate qualifies for grandfathering, FERC must
determine whether the rate falls into one of the "substantially
changed circumstances" exceptions: (1) a change in the economic
circumstances that was the basis of the oil pipeline rate; or (2) a
change in the nature of the services which underlined the rate. 57
In Lakehead Pipe Line Co., L.P. (Lakehead),58 FERC concluded that
allowing limited partnerships similar to SFPP to include income tax
50. See id. at 227 (explaining when agency's interpretation is binding). An
agency's statutory interpretation is binding on the courts when Congress has left
an explicit gap in the statute and has delegated the agency the authority to admin-
ister the statute. Id.
51. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1801, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (2000) (noting that
FERC is responsible for establishing procedure for determining rates and for de-
ciding whether rate is just and reasonable).
52. See 557 F.2d 775, 786 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting court's holding that pursu-
ant to EPAct, challenge is limited to reasonableness of rate).
53. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (describing pro-
cess for challenging grandfathered rate); see also 49 U.S.C. § 60502 (2000) (discuss-
ing FERC's responsibilities concerning pipeline rates).
54. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (describing pro-
cess for challenging grandfathered status of rate). FERC proceedings are insti-
tuted by a complaint and in those proceedings, FERC may conclude that a rate is
not just and reasonable. Id.
55. See 374 F.3d at 1272 (discussing procedure for challenging pipeline rates).
56. See id. (noting that when deciding whether rate qualifies for grandfather-
ing, FERC must consider requirements enumerated in EPAct).
57. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (discussing stat-
utory changed circumstances requirements).
58. 71 FERC P 61,338 (June 15, 1995).
6
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allowances in their rates constituted a substantial economic
change.59
Courts usually give FERC substantial deference in adjudica-
tions, which is consistent with the policy objectives of EPAct. 60 In
Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. Federal Energy Regulatoiy Commission,61 the
D.C. Circuit noted that on appeal of a FERC adjudication, the in-
quiry is whether FERC's decision was "arbitrary and capricious."62
FERC's decision is deemed to be arbitrary and capricious if a court
determines that there is no rational connection between the facts
and the decision. 63 The D.C. Circuit determined that FERC is enti-
tled to judicial deference for reasonable conclusions because of the
agency's expertise. 64
D. FERC'S Jurisdiction over Unfiled Rates
The Supreme Court held that a regulated entity may not
charge service rates which are different than those properly filed
with the appropriate regulatory authority in Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Hall65 Despite the "filed rate" doctrine established in Arkan-
sas Louisiana Gas Co., FERC concluded that unfiled rates were
within its jurisdiction because FERC would have grandfathered the
rates if filed because these rates were not challenged during the
one year prior to EPAct's enactment. 66
59. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1280 (discussing that Lakehead alone
does not satisfy substantial change threshold).
60. See Ass'n of Oil Pipelines v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 83 F.3d
1424, 1428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing how Congress transferred regulatory
authority over pipeline rates to FERC).
61. See id. (describing circumstances that encourage Congress to enact EP-
Act). In response to energy price shocks, Congress enacted EPAct as "part of a
comprehensive bill to reform national energy policy" by allowing prices to fluctu-
ate while simultaneously protecting shippers from paying excessive rates. Id. at
1429.
62. See id. at 1431 (noting that judicial review of FERC's determinations are
limited).
63. See id. (defining arbitrary and capricious).
64. See id. (explaining nature of FERC's adjudications requires certain skills
and experience).
65. See 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) (explaining principles underlying filed rate
doctrine). The EPAct's language limits FERC's jurisdiction to filed rates. Id.; see
also Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1802, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (2000). FERC, however,
concluded that it had jurisdiction over the enhanced contracts because these rates
were equal to other lawful and effective rates. BP West Coast Prods., LLC v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1263, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
66. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1981) (clari-
fying scope of authority). Pursuant to the filed rate doctrine, an entity may only
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. New Origination Point
In BP West Coast Products, the D.C. Circuit held that adding a
new origination point did not constitute a new tariff.67 In analyzing
FERC's conclusion that the new origination point's rates qualified
for grandfathering, the D.C. Circuit determined that the essential
issue was FERC's interpretation of the term "rate."68
The D.C. Circuit began by applying the Chevron test to deter-
mine the level of deference it should give to FERC's interpreta-
tion. 69 Although EPAct did not expressly grant FERC rulemaking
authority, the D.C. Circuit concluded that EPAct section 1803 con-
templated that FERC would enforce EPAct through formal adjudi-
cations. 70 Remaining consistent with its precedent, the D.C. Circuit
concluded that FERC's interpretation of EPAct was entitled to Chev-
ron deference. 7'
To be eligible for grandfathering, a pipeline rate must have
been effective before and through EPAct's enactment. 72 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed FERC's conclusion that the new rates were subject
to grandfathering, even though the new rates were not effective
before Congress enacted EPAct. 73 The D.C. Circuit explained that
67. See 374 F.3d at 1272 (explaining that new origination point did not consti-
tute new tariff because it was similar to rates of two other source points).
68. See id. (noting that level of deference in this case is particularly important
because this was case of first impression under EPAct's standards).
69. See id. at 1272-73 (determining whether D.C. Circuit should apply Chevron
deference to FERC's adjudications).
70. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (determining
when rate shall not be deemed just and reasonable). The D.C. Circuit refers to the
language of the statute that sets out that a challenge to a grandfathered rate is
"instituted as a result of a complaint." BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272; see also
Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172. Generally, when Congress
empowers an agency to adjudicate statutory challenges, the agency's adjudicatory
interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference. See United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). In Chevron, the court created a two-part test to deter-
mine the level of judicial deference that a court should give to an agency's inter-
pretations. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984). Under the Chevron analysis, if
Congress has not precisely addressed the issue, the court should defer to the
agency's reasonable statutory interpretations. Id.
71. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273 (applying Chevron two-part in-
quiry to this case). In EPAct, Congress did not explicitly address whether the ad-
ding of a new origination point would constitute a new rate. Id.
72. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (discussing
EPAct's 365-day requirement for grandfathering).
73. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272 (noting that rate at issue was
similar to other source rates in area). FERC suggested that a new origination point
that does not change the products shipped or services provided does not consti-
tute a new rate change. Id.
[Vol. XVI: p. 237
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FERC's conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious because
SFPP completed the additions without changing the then existing
rates.74 The D.C. Circuit thus found that FERC's interpretation was
reasonable, and therefore, the rates qualified for grandfathering.7 5
B. Unfiled Rates Under EPAct
Next, the D.C. Circuit reviewed FERC's order requiring SFPP
to "file a rate equal to the historic charge in shipper contracts" 76 for
its enhanced services.77 The D.C. Circuit vacated part of the order
because FERC's reasoning was fundamentally flawed. 78 FERC's rea-
soning was fundamentally flawed because EPAct section 1803 only
applies to filed rates. 79 FERC, therefore, could not assume that no
one would have challenged these rates had they been filed in order
to grandfather these rates.80 In conclusion, the D.C. Circuit noted
that FERC "must take the rates as it finds them, and here, FERC
found them unfiled."8'
The D.C. Circuit also noted various problems that would arise
if unfiled rates received grandfathering treatment.8 2 In particular,
the court would have the difficult task of determining whether the
unfiled rate was effective for an entire year preceding EPAct's en-
actment.8 3 Since it would be hard to prove that the rates qualified
74. See id. at 1273 (analogizing adding new origination point to adding on-
ramp to highway).
75. See generally id. (noting that rate qualified for grandfathering so long as
there was no substantial change).
76. See id. (discussing FERC's conclusion). FERC concluded that SFPP's en-
hanced services contracts were within FERC's jurisdiction, so FERC ordered SFPP
to file those contracts with it. Id.
77. See id. at 1274 (criticizing FERC's assumptions and reasoning). According
to the court, "[t] he Commission [FERC] may not regulate rates as if they existed in
a world that never was." Id. Even if FERC concluded that the contracts existed for
one year prior to EPAct's enactment, the rates did not qualify for grandfathering
because these rates failed to satisfy the requirement that they were unchallenged
for that period. Id.
78. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274 (noting that FERC may not
grandfather unfiled rates based on speculation).
79. See id. (noting that FERC is precluded from grandfathering unfiled rates).
80. See id. (noting that D.C. Circuit was not required to decide whether EPAct
section 1803 applied solely to filed rates because other ambiguities would have
precluded these rates from being grandfathered).
81. See id. (discussing that FERC may not rely on speculation).
82. See id. (discussing difficulty in distinguishing which rates were actually in
effect one year prior to enactment of EPAct from those that were not in effect).
83. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274 (implying that FERC's conclusion
suggests that any rate enacted prior to October 1992 qualified for grandfathering).
Further, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that allowing any rate effective before EPAct's
enactment to be grandfathered would undermine EPAct's purpose, which is "to
insulate pipelines from challenges to . . . rates." Id.
2005]
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for grandfathering, the D.C. Circuit refused to affirm FERC's con-
clusion that the new rate was subject to grandfathering.8 4
C. New Type of Fuel
The D.C. Circuit held that Tariff No. 18, concerning the new
product turbine fuel, was not subject to grandfathering because the
rate was initiated after the time period for grandfathering ex-
pired.8 5 FERC previously determined that Tariff No. 18 qualified
for grandfathering because the rate was equal to other rates that
FERC had considered just and reasonable.8 6 FERC thus concluded
that there was no reason to apply a different rate for turbine fuel. 87
FERC recognized that the revision of Tariff No. 18 in Decem-
ber 1992, effected to accommodate the transportation of turbine
fuel, could not be grandfathered because this service was new.88
Nonetheless, FERC reasoned that because the turbine fuel rate was
equal to other Tariff No. 18 rates that had been deemed just and
reasonable, "there [was] no basis for providing a different rate level
for turbine fuel at this time."89 The D.C. Circuit rejected this
conclusion. 9 0
Instead, the D.C. Circuit determined that Tariff No. 18's other
rates were deemed just and reasonable by operation of law because
those rates were not challenged during the one year prior to
EPAct's enactment. 9' This, however, is merely a requirement for
grandfathering; it does not measure a rate's actual reasonable-
84. See id. (noting that in absence of confirmation that rate was effective one
year prior to EPAct's enactment, court could not extend grandfathering benefits).
FERC indicated that the parties voluntarily entered into the contracts prior to 1992
and were executed prior to June 1, 1992. Grayling Generating Station, L.P., 86 FERC
P 61,075 (Jan. 28, 1999).
85. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (concluding that rate did not
meet grandfathering requirements).
86. See id. at 1274-75 (concluding that rate for new service precluded from
grandfathering because it constituted substantial change).
87. See id. (discussing that Tariff No. 18 rates were deemed just and reasona-
ble by operation of law because they were not challenged during one year period
prior to EPAct's enactment). FERC concluded that the turbine fuel rates were just
and reasonable because they were equal to rates that met the statutory require-
ments. Id.
88. See id. (explaining that D.C. Circuit concluded that rate for new service
was precluded from grandfathering because it constituted substantial change).
89. See id. (holding rates deemed just and reasonable by operation of law be-
cause they were not challenged during one year period prior to EPAct's
enactment).
90. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274-75 (stating court's reason for lack
of judicial deference).
91. See id. (explaining that Tariff No. 18 rates were not actually just and rea-
sonable simply because they were deemed just and reasonable). Further, the D.C.
10
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/4
OIL PIPELINE RATES
ness.9 2 The fact that the rates were deemed just and reasonable does
not mean that the rates actually are just and reasonable. 93 The D.C.
Circuit determined that FERC's analysis failed to address the tur-
bine fuel rate's substantive reasonableness. 94 Therefore, this rate
was not eligible for grandfathering.9 5
D. Protest, Investigation or Complaint
The shippers alleged that the rates were "subject to protest,
investigation or complaint" during the one year period prior to
EPAct's enactment.96 The D.C. Circuit deferred to FERC's conclu-
sion that these rates were not subject to protest, investigation or
complaint during the one year period prior to EPAct's enact-
ment.9 7 FERC concluded that to challenge rates that had been
deemed just and reasonable, one would need to show more than a
general protest, investigation or complaint. 98 To successfully chal-
lenge a rate, one would need to show that the rate's reasonableness
had been subject to protest, investigation or complaint. 99
Circuit stated that if FERC conducted a substantive review of rates, then its conclu-
sion may have been valid. Id.
92. See id. at 1275 (holding that FERC's conclusion undermined nature and
purpose of EPAct's grandfathering provisions).
93. See id. (holding that new rates, such as turbine fuel, are not eligible for
grandfathering). Since the rate cannot be grandfathered on its own merits, the
rate cannot "simply piggyback on the grandfathered status of other rates." Id.
94. See id. (noting that judicial deference could not be extended because
FERC's interpretation of EPAct was arbitrary and capricious).
95. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (discussing that D.C. Circuit
determined FERC's decision was arbitrary and capricious because FERC did not
conduct substantive review of the rate).
96. See id. at 1276 (noting in pleadings that West Line rates were challenged
based on flow, reversal, prorationing and existing East Line rates). The D.C. Cir-
cuit determined that these pleadings did not violate § 1803 because they failed to
challenge the reasonableness of the new rates. Id.
97. See id. (challenging West Line rates based on flow reversal, prorationing
and existing rates on SFPP's East Line, court concluded, failed to challenge rea-
sonableness of West Lines rates in protests to Tariff Nos. 15 and 16 and, therefore,
had not violated requirements of § 1803). In addition, the court rejected the ship-
pers' argument that the West Line rates were subject to investigation. Id. at 1278.
Assuming that the Oil Pipeline Board Investigation was vacated but technically left
open, the scope of the Board's investigation is limited to newly filed rates or prac-
tices. Id. Therefore, because no changes were made to the West Line rates, except
the addition of a new origination point and transportation of new fuel, the Board
would have been precluded from investigating the West Line rates. Id. The court
thus concluded that the rates, except for the new origination point and fuel rates,
were subject to grandfathering, and therefore, deemed just and reasonable pursu-
ant to § 1803(a). Id.
98. See id. (noting that D.C. Circuit did not review all West Line rates).
99. See id. (noting that general attack on validity of rate does not satisfy EPAct
requirements for challenging grandfathered rate).
2005]
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The D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC's interpretation was not
an unreasonable statutory interpretation, and so deferred to
FERC's interpretation. 100 Thus, the D.C. Circuit held that this pro-
vision was limited to specific protests, investigations or complaints
challenging a rate's reasonableness. 10 1
E. Shippers' Challenges Pursuant to EPAct
The D.C. Circuit held that the time period for demonstrating
substantial economic change was clear on the face of the statute. 10 2
In response to the shippers' argument that the challenged rates fell
within the substantial change exception, FERC concluded that a
substantial change is a heightened standard which the shippers
failed to meet. 10 3 The shippers did not meet the changed circum-
stances threshold because increased usage is not a fundamental
component of a rate whose change would result in a substantial
economic change.10 4 Further, FERC determined that the shippers
used an improper time period to calculate the substantial change in
economic circumstances. 10 5
In response, the shippers did not challenge the substantial eco-
nomic change threshold. 10 6 They maintained, however, that FERC
employed a "newly articulated standard" in its ruling and, there-
fore, the D.C. Circuit should remand the case to allow the shippers
100. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1276 (refuting shippers' argument).
The shippers argued that FERC's interpretation was erroneous because it added a
requirement not contained in the text. Id. Yet, the D.C. Circuit determined that
FERC's interpretation was reasonable. Id.
101. See id. (noting that D.C. Circuit determined that statutory language re-
quired protest, investigation or complaint to concern rate).
102. See id. at 1279-80 (discussing reasons for not permitting shippers to
demonstrate substantial change circumstances).
103. See id. at 1279 (noting that shippers failed to use correct time period
when determining increased throughput).
104. See 1999 Comm. On Oil Pipeline Reg. Ann. Rep., A.B.A Sec. Pub. Util.,
Comm. And Transp. L., http://www, abanet. org/pubutil / oil. html (discussing
FERC's interpretation of EPAct language regarding grandfathered rates and sub-
stantially changed circumstances). To satisfy the substantially changed circum-
stances threshold, a challenger must demonstrate that a material change has
occurred to one of the following elements that was the basis for the grandfathered
rate: (1) volumes; (2) asset base; (3) operating costs; (4) capital costs. Id.
105. See id. (describing appropriate time periods of comparison for measur-
ing substantially changed circumstances). FERC concluded that to establish a sub-
stantial change, the shippers should have compared the period before the West
Line rates became effective in 1989 to the period between EPAct's enactment and
the date of a filed complaint. Id.
106. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1279 (noting that shippers proposed
that they should be allowed to litigate under newly articulated evidentiary
requirement).
12
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an opportunity to litigate under this new standard.' 0 7 The court
rejected the shippers' argument by concluding that the statutory
language was sufficiently clear concerning the time period in a sub-
stantial change analysis. 08 The D.C. Circuit did not remand the
case on this claim because the statute provided the shippers with
"adequate notice" of the statutory standards. 10 9
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case based on the shippers'
alternative claim that SFPP's inclusion of income tax allowances in
its rates constituted a substantial economic change. 110 In Lakehead,
FERC held that limited partnerships may include certain income
tax allowances in their cost of service. 1 In BP West Coast Products,
FERC refused to apply Lakehead because the shippers did not prove
how the Lakehead policy would affect the economic basis for the
rates and so this did not constitute substantially changed circum-
stances. 112 The court remanded the claim for further considera-
tion because it deemed certain "aspects of the Commission's
Lakehead policy [to be] arbitrary and capricious." 1 3
107. See id. (noting that shippers did not contest FERC's interpretation of
EPAct's substantial change provision or FERC's holding that shippers failed to
meet substantial change standard).
108. See id. (noting that statutory text supports FERC's holding). To prove
changed economic circumstances, a shipper must show that the economic circum-
stances underlying the rate have changed. Id.
109. See id. at 1279-80 (noting clear textual support on statute's face). EPAct
provides that the complaint must show that a substantial change occurred after
EPAct's enactment. Id.; see also Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172.
The D.C. Circuit held that pursuant to the statute, the first time when a shipper
can prove a substantial change is after EPAct's enactment, BP West Coast Prods., 374
F.3d at 1279-80. The statutory language providing that "no 'complaint' may be
filed unless 'evidence is presented' with the complaint that demonstrates that a
substantial change 'has occurred'" meant that the last day for evidence to be
presented is the day the complaint is filed. Id.; see also Energy Policy Act of 1992
§ 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172.
110. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1280 (noting that D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that certain aspects of FERC's Lakehead adjudication were arbitrary and ca-
pricious). The D.C. Circuit rejected FERC's conclusion that the mere existence of
the Lakehead policy, in the absence of showing how the policy affected the rates'
economic basis, did not constitute evidence of substantially changed circum-
stances. Id.
111. See Lakehead Pipe Line Co., L.P., 71 FERC P 61,338 (June 15, 1995) (dis-
cussing evidence of changed cost of service).
112. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1280 (noting that policy by itself is
not evidence of substantial change because FERC must show how policy's applica-
tion constituted substantial change).
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V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit Court correctly interpreted EPAct's grand-
fathering provisions because the court strictly adhered to the stat-
ute's requirements for grandfathering. 114
A. Chevron Deference
The D.C. Circuit conferred substantial deference to FERC's in-
terpretation of the word "rate."115 Applying Chevron deference was
proper in this instance because, through EPAct, Congress impliedly
delegated to FERC the authority to administer the grandfathering
clause. 116 In Mead, the Supreme Court determined that when a
statute contains gaps which the agency must fill, Congress is
deemed to have delegated to the agency the authority to create reg-
ulations to fill the gap. 117 Congress thus impliedly delegated to
FERC the authority to administer EPAct's grandfathering
provisions. 118
EPAct states that when challenging a rate that is deemed just
and reasonable, a person must present evidence to FERC "which
establishes that a substantial change has occurred after the date of
the enactment of this Act."'1 9 Moreover, the statute states that "[i]f
the Commission determines pursuant to a proceeding instituted as
114. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (analyzing lan-
guage of statute in light of statutory purpose).
115. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. Fed. Regulatory Comm'n, 83 F.3d 1424, 1429
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing how substantial deference to FERC's adjudications is
consistent with Congress' policy objectives behind EPAct). EPAct was enacted to
reform America's energy policy objectives "in response to energy price shocks in
the prior two decades." Id. Those objectives were to streamline regulation and
provide price flexibility, while preventing excessive rates. Id. Therefore, courts
give deference to FERC to further the statutory objective and avoid unnecessary
cost, delays and charges against any captive shippers on oil pipelines. Id.
116. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273 (concluding that FERC's inter-
pretation of rate was just and reasonable).
117. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (discussing that
when Congress expressly delegates authority to agency, agency's adjudications are
binding "unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
manifestly contrary to the statute"). Courts should give substantial deference to
FERC's adjudications because this is consistent with policy objectives behind
EPAct. Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1429.
118. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (outlining FERC's au-
thority to adjudicate). EPAct states that in addition to FERC's specific statutory
functions, "[t] he Commission may exercise any power under the following sections
to the extent the Commission determines such power to be necessary to the exer-
cise of any function within the jurisdiction of the Commission." 42 U.S.C.
§ 7172(a) (2).
119. See id. (enumerating statutory requirements to challenge grandfathered
rate).
14
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a result of a complaint.., that the rate is not just and reasonable,
the rate shall not be deemed just and reasonable." 120 This statutory
language suggests that Congress intended that shippers would file
complaints with FERC and that FERC would then review the evi-
dence and decide the case consistent with the terms and conditions
of EPAct's grandfathering provisions. 2 1
In addition to this grant of authority, the courts give great def-
erence to an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers. 22
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit properly applied Chevron deference be-
cause Congress impliedly delegated to FERC the authority to adju-
dicate disputes concerning the grandfathering provisions. 123
B. East Hynes Station
In EPAct, Congress did not directly speak to the issue of
whether adding a new origination point, East Hynes Station, on an
already existing pipeline constitutes a new rate.1 2 4 Rate is defined
in EPAct as "all charges that an oil pipeline requires shippers to pay
for transportation services."'1 25 The definition, however, remains si-
lent with respect to the issue of adding new origination points.1 26
120. See id. (describing weight of agency adjudication).
121. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272 (discussing reasoning for con-
ferring Chevron deference).
122. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (describing reasons for extending judicial def-
erence to administrative agency's statutory interpretations). Judicial deference is
reasonable because an agency's statutory interpretations are based on the agency's
experience and informed judgment. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998).
123. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984); see also Ass'n of Pipe Lines v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 83 F.3d 1424,
1428 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing history of oil pipeline rate regulation). Since the
Hepburn Act of 1906, oil pipelines were regulated under the Interstate Commerce
Act (ICA). Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1428. In the Department of Energy
Organization Act, FERC was delegated the authority to regulate the oil pipelines.
Id. In accordance with FERC's authority, Congress directed FERC to devise its own
rules consistent with § 1 (5) of the ICA which requires just and reasonable rates.
Id. The authority Congress delegated to FERC to promulgate final rules for
ratemaking and procedures is an example of the explicit agency authority neces-
sary for Chevron deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
124. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (noting that where agency's interpretation is
reasonable, judicial deference will be given). Id. With respect to the issue of
whether the addition of a new origination point constitutes a new rate, Congress
has not directly spoken to the issue, therefore, the court must determine whether
FERC's interpretation of the statute was reasonable. BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d
at 1273.
125. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1804(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (providing
definitions).
126. See id. § 1804 (stating statutory definition). The issue of whether the ad-
dition of a new origination point constituted a new rate ineligible for grandfather-
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Due to this silence, the court properly deferred to FERC's reasona-
ble statutory interpretation. 12 7
Based on FERC's interpretation of rate, FERC concluded that
the new rate from East Hynes Station was still subject to
grandfathering for two reasons: (1) the rate from the new origina-
tion point was not new; and (2) there was no change to the service
being provided from this new point.128 Although SFPP revised
Tariff Nos. 15, 16 and 17 in July 1992 after the one year period had
already begun to run, FERC concluded that the addition of a rate
for shipping services from a new origination point to Arizona was
not new because it was equal to SFPP's rates at two of its other
source points. 129 Also, there was no change since EPAct's enact-
ment in the services being provided. 130 The rate from East Hynes
station, therefore, was subject to grandfathering. 131
The D.C. Circuit affirmed FERC's interpretation of the rate as
reasonable because absent a change to existing shipping rates, a
rate is not considered new.' 3 2 Further, EPAct also states that any
rate effective for the one year period prior to EPAct's enactment is
deemed just and reasonable, regardless of whether a new rate has
been filed during this period. 133 Therefore, since the rate for East
127. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (holding courts must give judicial deference
to reasonable agency interpretations). Congress has not directly spoken to the
issue of whether adding a new origination point constituted a new rate, therefore
the D.C. Circuit had to determine whether FERC's statutory interpretation was
reasonable. BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273.
128. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272-73 (discussing FERC's adjudica-
tions).
129. See id. at 1272 (discussing new origination point rate). The rate from the
new origination point qualified for grandfathering because it was equal to SFPP's
other filed rates and did not involve a change in rate or services SFPP provided
prior to EPAct's enactment. Id.
130. See id. (discussing FERC's reasons for extending grandfathering benefits
to rate of new origination point).
131. See id. at 1273 (concluding that adding new origination point to already
existing rate structure, without changing existing shipping rates, was not new rate).
132. See id. (affirming FERC decisions on new origination point). The D.C.
Circuit held that FERC's statutory interpretation was permissible and, therefore,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed the conclusion that the East Hynes shipping rate quali-
fied for grandfathering. Id.
133. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (discussing
requirements for rate to be deemed just and reasonable). The improvements to
the West Line made after October 1991 were eligible for grandfathering because
the revised rates satisfied the statutory requirements. BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d
at 1273. The revised rate already was effective prior to EPAct's enactment. Id.
Also, the revised rate was neither a substantial change in the economic circum-
stances nor in the nature of the services provided, which were the basis of the rate.
Id. Therefore, the statutory requirements to challenge the reasonableness of a rate
were not met. Id.
16
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Hynes was equal to two of SFPP's other source points that were ef-
fective since 1989, and both the product and service being provided
had not changed, the D.C. Circuit concluded that pursuant to
EPAct's terms, the rate was just and reasonable, and thus, eligible
for grandfathering. 134
C. Unfiled Rates
The "filed rate" doctrine gives FERC "an opportunity in every
case to judge the reasonableness of the rate."13 5 Since most of
SFPP's rates were unfiled, FERC was precluded from judging their
reasonableness during the one year period prior to EPAct's
enactment.
1 3 6
By November 1, 1991, most of SFPP's shippers had entered
into contracts with new, unfiled rates for enhanced shipping ser-
vices. 13 7 These rates were not filed with FERC by October 1991,
and this precluded FERC from having an opportunity to review the
reasonableness of the rate during the 365-day period prior to
EPAct's enactment.13 8 Despite the statutory requirements, FERC
concluded that these unfiled rates qualified for grandfathering
1 39
134. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273 (holding rate for new origina-
tion point is just and reasonable). The D.C. Circuit denied the shippers' challenge
to the eligibility for grandfathering of improvements to the West Line. Id.
135. See Tex. Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
102 F.3d 174, 182 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that filed rate doctrine also serves to
give customers advance notice of new rates).
136. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273 (discussing reasons for not af-
firming FERC's adjudication regarding this issue).
137. See id. (explaining enhanced shipping service contracts). In 1989, SFPP
notified its shippers that Watson's (the West Line's primary origination point),
minimum pumping rate and pressure would increase. Id. SFPP gave its shippers
the option of providing their own pressurization facilities or using one of SFPP's
facilities for a surcharge. Id. The majority of SFPP's shippers had entered into
contracts to use SFPP's enhanced services. Id. On November 1, 1991, SFPP began
its new enhanced facility. Id. SFPP, however, never filed the enhanced services
contracts with FERC because it believed these contracts were beyond FERC'sjuris-
diction. Id.
138. See id. (discussing that FERC did not become aware of these contracts
until 1991). When FERC found out about the enhanced services contracts, it re-
quired SFPP "to file a rate equal to historic charge in the shipper contracts." Id.
139. See id. (explaining FERC's decision to grandfather unfiled rates). FERC
reasoned that enhanced services contracts qualified for grandfathering because
the contracts were enforceable, the contract rates were equal to an enforceable
rate and the contracts were effective prior to EPAct's enactment. Id. at 1273-74.
As a result, FERC concluded that to challenge the enhanced services contract
rates, the shippers must present evidence of a substantial change because these
rates qualified for grandfathering as they were not challenged during the one year
period prior to EPAct's enactment. Id. at 1274. Thus, FERC denied the shippers'
challenge to the rates because they were not filed. Id.
2005] 253
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In BP West Coast Products, the D.C. Circuit used the statutory
language to conclude that the unfiled rates did not qualify for
grandfathering because they failed to meet the statutory require-
ments.140 The D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the rates could not be
grandfathered because it was impossible to ascertain whether all of
the contracts met the requirements for grandfathering, proved
just.141
The statutory requirements for grandfathering are clear. 142 A
rate must be effective for at least one year prior to EPAct's enact-
ment and, during this time, the rate must not be subject to protest
investigation or complaint.143 The effective date of the unfiled
rates was unknown, so some may have come into effect after the
one year period lapsed, precluding the rates from qualifying for
grandfathering. 144  To conclude otherwise would undermine
EPAct's purpose to streamline litigation over pre-existing EPAct
rates.145
Further, the D.C. Circuit should not extend judicial deference
to FERC's reasoning that had the rates been filed, they would not
have been subject to protest, investigation or complaint. 146 Judicial
deference is accorded where FERC's adjudication is reasonable.1 47
FERC's factual determinations are conclusive if they are supported
by substantial evidence. 148 Here, FERC's conclusion is not sup-
140. See id. at 1274 (noting statutory authority requires that rates be filed).
141. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274 (explaining unfiled rates cannot
meet statutory requirements for grandfathering eligibility). Pursuant to § 1803, a
rate may only be grandfathered if the rate was effective and unchallenged during
the one year period prior to the enactment of EPAct. Energy Policy Act of 1992
§ 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172.
142. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274. The evidence presented sug-
gested that some of the rates became effective so it was impossible to determine
which rates satisfied the one year requirement, and therefore, the D.C. Circuit
held that none of the rates qualified for grandfathering after October 1991. Id.
143. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (providing re-
quirements for rate to be deemed just and reasonable).
144. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1274 (explaining that because of
uncertainties surrounding rates' effective date, no rates qualified for
grandfathering).
145. See id. at 1271-72 (noting that limiting shippers' ability to challenge rate
effective prior to EPAct limits litigation because now to challenge rate, shippers
must present evidence that substantial change has occurred).
146. See Tex. Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 102
F.3d 174, 181 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting circumstances where FERC's decisions re-
ceive judicial deference).
147. See id. (discussing when courts should give judicial deference).
148. See id. (noting that court will set aside agency determinations unsup-
ported by substantial evidence).
18
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ported by substantial evidence because its conclusion was based on
pure speculation. 49
EPAct was designed to streamline litigation for rates that were
deemed just and reasonable prior to its enactment. 150 Permitting
FERC to deviate from EPAct's requirements would allow FERC to
extend the benefits of grandfathering arbitrarily and allow shippers
to entirely circumvent litigation.1 51 The D.C. Circuit thus properly
concluded that FERC's reasoning was "fundamentally flawed," and
properly vacated FERC's determination. 152
D. Transportation of Turbine Fuel
The D.C. Circuit's conclusion that the new fuel rate could not
be grandfathered because this rate was not filed during the one
year period prior to EPAct's enactment, was reasonable because the
tariff was not actually reviewed prior to a determination that it was
just and reasonable.' 53 Pursuant to EPAct, FERC has a dual respon-
sibility: (1) to ensure just and reasonable pipeline rates; and (2) to
simplify and streamline ratemaking through generally applicable
procedures.154 Although FERC has attempted "to conduct only
very light-handed regulation," the court has required FERC "to
comply ... with its duty to ensure that oil pipeline rates 'shall be
just and reasonable.' "155 Despite the statutory requirements, FERC
concluded that the rate for turbine fuel was unchallengeable be-
cause it was equal to other Tariff No. 18 rates that were deemed just
and reasonable. 156
149. SeeBP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1273-74 (stating FERC's reasoning for
grandfathering unfiled rates). FERC reasoned that the unfiled rates qualified for
grandfathering because the rates were unchallenged during the one year period
prior to EPAct's enactment. Id.
150. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 83 F.3d 1424,
1429-30 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing Congress' reasons behind EPAct).
151. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272-73 (discussing D.C. Circuit's
reasons for not according judicial deference to FERC's adjudications). If FERC
could extend grandfathering at its discretion, FERC would violate its purpose to
enforce the terms and conditions of EPAct. Id.
152. See id. at 1274 (stating D.C. Circuit's holding).
153. See id. at 1275 (discussing turbine fuel rates). It was noted that the tur-
bine fuel rates having been "deemed just and reasonable does not mean that the
rates actually are just and reasonable." Id.
154. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1428 (discussing Congress' purpose
for enacting EPAct).
155. See id. at 1429 (citing Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 734 F.2d 1486, 1500-10 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
156. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (noting that rate did not qualify
for grandfathering because it was considered new).
2005]
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This conclusion is contrary to the intent of EPAct to streamline
litigation regarding just and reasonable oil pipeline rates. 157 Con-
gress transferred regulatory authority to FERC in EPAct, while also
working in conjunction with FERC to create EPAct provisions, both
of which affirm FERC's adjudicative authority. 15 8 Despite FERC's
duty to ensure that oil pipeline rates are just and reasonable, the
grandfathered status of rates is subject to specific narrow exceptions
enumerated in the statute. 159 As a result, FERC is precluded from
departing from the statutory exceptions and creating its own ad hoc
determinations. 60
The rate was not just and reasonable because the turbine fuel
rate was new and the time had lapsed for it to be protected by the
provision.1 61 The turbine fuel service itself was new and would
likely result in increased cost for operating pipelines or volumes
which are two basic elements of the economic basis for a rate to
qualify as a substantial change precluding the rate from grand-
fathering.162
The D.C. Circuit properly vacated FERC's conclusion and re-
quired it to enforce the statutory terms and conditions. 163 Consis-
tent with the holding of the D.C. Circuit, FERC cannot extend the
protections of grandfathering to rates that were not effective one
year prior to EPAct's enactment even if FERC's rationale is to fur-
ther the purpose of EPAct to reduce litigation. 164
Further, the D.C. Circuit precluded FERC from reaching a
conclusion that was inconsistent with the evidence presented. 165 In
157. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1429-30 (describing how EPAct was
formulated to execute Congress' intent).
158. See id. at 1428-29 (discussing delegation of regulatory authority to FERC,
as well as Congress' requirement that FERC execute EPAct to further national en-
ergy policy).
159. See id. at 1429 (noting that Congress enacted EPAct to streamline process
for challenging grandfathered rates to avoid unnecessary litigation).
160. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (enumerating lim-
ited challenges that one may bring under EPAct); see also BP West Coast Prods., 374
F.3d at 1272 (noting only grandfathered rates falling within exception may be al-
tered by FERC).
161. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (discussing FERC's flawed
conclusion).
162. See id. (noting that with regard to turbine fuel, FERC determined that
service was new and therefore did not qualify for grandfathering).
163. See generally Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (describ-
ing statutory grandfathering requirements rate must meet).
164. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1271-72 (discussing that turbine fuel
was new product and its transportation was new service provided after EPAct's
enactment).
165. See id. (noting that FERC concluded that turbine fuel could not be
grandfathered). In general, a court should give deference to an agency's statutory
20
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BP West Coast Products, the turbine fuel rate was new, and the time
had lapsed for it to be protected by the provision. 16 6 If the D.C.
Circuit deemed the rate just and reasonable solely because it was
equal to other rates that had been legitimately deemed just and
reasonable under EPAct, the court would create a slippery slope
whereby FERC would be responsible for determining under what
circumstances a rate that fails the statutory requirements is still enti-
tled to grandfathering benefits. 167 These arbitrary adjudications
would undermine the purpose of EPAct's requirements for grand-
fathering.168
EPAct serves to protect pipeline rates that have undergone sub-
stantive review and have satisfied the specific requirements enumer-
ated in the statute to be considered just and reasonable. 1 69
Allowing a rate to receive the protections of EPAct without under-
going a substantive review of a rate's reasonableness would permit
FERC to arbitrarily decide which rates are grandfathered without
adhering to the terms of EPAct and thus circumvent litigation
entirely.170
Congress gave FERC regulatory authority in the administration
of EPAct, but Congress did not grant FERC discretionary power to
deem any rate just and reasonable. 17 1 In BP West Coast Products, the
D.C. Circuit correctly concluded that grandfathering benefits did
not extend to the turbine fuel rate because it was impossible to as-
certain whether the turbine fuel rate met the statutory
requirements. 172
interpretation if its interpretation "reasonably flows from the evidence," and is not
arbitrary or capricious. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 83
F.3d 1424, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
166. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1275 (noting that turbine fuel could
not be grandfathered because it failed to meet EPAct's requirements).
167. See id. (noting that FERC is prohibited from making arbitrary adjudica-
tions about substantive reasonableness of rates).
168. See id. at 1271 (discussing how EPAct limits shippers' ability to challenge
pipeline rates that were effective prior to EPAct's enactment).
169. See id. at 1275 (discussing requirements for rate to be considered just
and reasonable).
170. See id. at 1271 (noting that FERC "may not alter a grandfathered rate
that does not fall within an exception").
171. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (noting that
EPAct provides that rates that meet statutory requirements "shall be deemed just
and reasonable").
172. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1271 (discussing rates deemed just
and reasonable must meet statutory requirements). The evidence presented was
inconclusive because it did not confirm when the turbine rates became effective.
Id. The D.C. Circuit properly noted that the evidence presented did not support
FERC's conclusion. Id. at 1275-78. The shippers' evidence was inconclusive be-
cause it was evidence of a general challenge to the rates. Id.
2005]
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E. Protest, Investigation or Complaint
The D.C. Circuit properly interpreted the statutory language
concerning the specificity required to successfully challenge the
statute. 173 Pursuant to EPAct, a rate that has satisfied the one year
requirement period and "has not been subject to protest, investiga-
tion, or complaint during such 365-day period" is deemed just and
reasonable. 174 The D.C. Circuit's holding is consistent with the stat-
utory language and purpose because a grandfathered rate is a rate
that has already been deemed just and reasonable. 75 To success-
fully challenge a grandfathered rate, a shipper must present evi-
dence that establishes that the rate is not reasonable and should
not be protected by EPAct.1 76
VI. IMPACT
BP West Coast Products represents the principle that if FERC's
decisions are considered arbitrary and capricious, a court will
strictly adhere to EPAct. 177 Courts have recognized this proposi-
tion, noting that when reviewing grandfathered rates, a court's
main inquiry is whether FERC's action was arbitrary and capri-
cious. 17 8 Courts' limited review of FERC's determinations serves as
a check on FERC's regulatory authority and ensures that FERC ad-
heres to its duties to enforce the terms and conditions of EPAct. 179
By strictly adhering to EPAct's requirements, the D.C. Circuit
has clarified the changed circumstances threshold, and conse-
quently furthered EPAct's objective to streamline litigation in four
173. See id. (discussing that grandfathered rate can only be challenged if it
falls within statutory exception).
174. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1803(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (describing
requirements for grandfathering).
175. See id. (noting statutory language stating when rate is grandfathered).
176. See Mobil Alaska Pipeline Co. v. United States, 557 F.2d 775, 775-86 (5th Cir.
1977) (noting that at hearings, FERC must examine "lawfulness of a filed tariff
stating a new rate or change"). A lawful rate is a just and reasonable rate. Id.
177. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines v. Fed. Regulatoiy Energy Comm'n, 83 F.3d 1424,
1429 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984) (explaining courts should give judicial deference to
agency adjudications as long as agency's conclusion is reasonable). FERC's duty is
"to ensure that oil pipeline rates 'shall be deemed just and reasonable'." Ass'n of
Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1429.
178. See Ass'n of Oil Pipe Lines, 83 F.3d at 1431 (discussing nature of judicial
review of agency's determinations). In examining whether FERC's adjudications
were reasonable, a court should determine whether a rational connection between
the evidence provided and the decision rendered exists. Id.
179. See id. (noting elements that indicate substantially changed circum-
stances); see also BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272 (explaining FERC's role).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 16, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol16/iss2/4
OIL PIPELINE RATES
ways.' 80 First, the D.C. Circuit held that adding a new origination
point to an already existing pipeline does not constitute a substan-
tial change.181 This determination will help reduce unnecessary lit-
igation premised upon this argument in the future and further
EPAct's policy objectives.18 2
Second, although FERC's adjudication was not appealed, it is
important to note that FERC's definition of a substantial change
has also provided clarity for potential future challengers. 183 Third,
in order to meet this heightened threshold, a shipper must show
that the substantial change occurred during the stipulated time pe-
riod.1 84 The D.C. Circuit, adhering to FERC's conclusion, held that
the requisite time period to demonstrate a substantial change is the
period before the rate became effective, the basis of the rate, and
anytime throughout the rate's effectiveness until the complaint is
filed.' 85
Fourth, the D.C. Circuit limited challenging a grandfathered
rate based on protest, investigation or complaint to those that had
previously challenged the rates' reasonableness. 18 6 Since this is the
first time that the changed circumstances standard has been liti-
gated, these determinations are important as they shed light on the
burden of proof necessary to challenge a grandfathered pipeline
rate. 18
7
Clarifying the requirements of the statute not only provides a
potential challenger with the appropriate threshold requirements
necessary to bring a claim, but it also helps owners of pipelines de-
180. See Oil Pipeline Regulation Committee, supra note 8 (describing impor-
tance of challenges to SFPP's rates in clarifying EPAct).
181. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1272-73 (discussing relationship be-
tween change of origination point and EPAct).
182. See Ass'n of Oil Pipelines, 83 F.3d at 1429 (discussing EPAct's to set up
clear standards to avoid unnecessary costs and delays).
183. See ARCO Products Co., 106 FERC P 61,300 (2004) (noting FERC's defini-
tion of substantial change as something greater than material change). In order to
challenge a grandfathered rate, a shipper is required to support his complaint with
enough evidence to exceed the material change threshold. Id. Evidence
presented must demonstrate a substantial change has occurred to at least one of
the fundamental elements that comprise the basis of a rate including: volumes,
asset base, operating costs, and capital costs. Id.
184. See BP West Coast Prods., 374 F.3d at 1279 (noting time period to demon-
strate substantial change to challenge rate's grandfathered status).
185. See id. at 1279-80 (describing appropriate time period for comparing
rates to prove substantial change).
186. See id. (noting that protest, investigation or complaint is limited to spe-
cific challenges).
187. See Moreen Lorenzetti, FERC Mainly Favors Shippers in Santa Fe Pipeline
Case, OIL & GAsJ. (April 19, 2004) (discussing importance of FERC adjudications
regarding SFPP rates in clarifying meaning of "changed circumstances").
2005] 259
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termine changes that would terminate grandfathered status of
rates. Further, by strictly adhering to the terms of EPAct and
preventing FERC from arriving at unfounded conclusions, the D.C.
Circuit has provided some legal certainty necessary to determine
the outcome of challenges to future rates.188
Alexandra Leidesdorf
188. See id. (noting that although it is too early to determine impact of FERC's
decision on industry, FERC's decisions have provided legal clarity).
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